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General Larry D. Welch was the 12th
Air Force Chief of Staff. As a field grade
officer, he was assigned to Headquarters
U.S. Air Force, under the Assistant Chief of
Staff for Studies and Analysis. General
Welch received the MORS Wanner Award
in 1998. He is currently a senior fellow at
the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA)
where he was President from 1990 to 2004.
MORS ORAL HISTORY
INTERVIEW WITH GENERAL LARRY D.
WELCH
September 8, 2004
Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA)
Alexandria, VA
JIM BEXFIELD, FS, AND BOB SHELDON,
FS, INTERVIEWERS
BOB SHELDON: This is the eighth of
September 2004, and we’re in the offices of
IDA to interview General Larry Welch.
General Welch, can we begin by describing
where you were born and raised?
LARRY WELCH: I was born in a little
town called Morning Star, Oklahoma,
which no longer exists.
BOB SHELDON: Let me next ask your
parents’ names and their backgrounds, and
how might they have influenced you.
LARRYWELCH:My father was Oliver
E. Welch, who died largely as a result of an
automobile accident when he was 94. My
mother is the former Nina Katherine Stew-
art. She is 94, still living and doing well. A
good part of my early life was in Kansas
and Oklahoma during the dust bowl, and
the Depression. In order for people to sur-
vive those years, you moved around a lot,
wherever the breadwinner could find use-
ful work. So up until World War II, we
lived in a number of places in western Kan-
sas, the Texas panhandle, Louisiana and
Oklahoma. When the war started, the eco-
nomic situation and the job situation im-
proved markedly. My father went to work
in the oil and gas industry. He finally set-
tled down at a natural gas compressor
plant in western Kansas until he retired
from the oil and gas business. So that’s a
picture of the earliest life I can recall. I went
to a number of schools. For years, I thought
I’d become a civil engineer and build
bridges. It turned out I didn’t build physi-
cal bridges, but I spent most of my active-
duty career building other kinds of bridges.
BOB SHELDON:Where did you go to
high school?
LARRY WELCH: I went to high school
in two places: Greensburg, Kansas, a small
town of about 1,500 people, and Liberal,
Kansas, a town of about 12,000 people. I
usually do not tell people I come from a
town named Liberal, because then I have to
explain why it’s called Liberal.
BOB SHELDON: Why is it called Lib-
eral?
LARRY WELCH: It was on the Chish-
olm Trail. And it was the only place on the
Trail that had both plentiful and free water.
They were very liberal with their water.
They were also very good businessmen be-
cause they attracted lots of cattle drives and
nothing else was free.
JIM BEXFIELD: Were you involved in
special activities in high school? What dis-
tinguished your high school career?
LARRY WELCH: Well, I don’t know
that it was very distinguished, but three
things are worth mentioning. One was that
I didn’t have to work very hard to get
straight A’s. Consequently, I didn’t prepare
myself very well for college. Second, since
we moved around, I found athletics to be a
good entre´e at the next place. So I played
varsity basketball, football, and ran the 880
in track. I never enjoyed it that much, but if
you were a varsity basketball player or
football player, you had immediate friends
in new places. I was also Yearbook editor.
Enjoyed editing—still do. I took as rigorous
an academic path as was offered in the local
high school. Calculus I, basic physics, and
basic chemistry were as far as you could go.
But though I went as far as I could go
academically, it really wasn’t a school ori-
ented at college preparation. I discovered
that fact of life my first year in college.
BOB SHELDON: I notice on your re-
sume’ it looks chronologically like you
joined the Guard before you went to col-
lege? Is that correct?
LARRY WELCH: Yes. We had an ar-
mored field artillery battery in Liberal—the
161st Armored Field Artillery. It was re-
garded as a high honor for a young man in
high school to be invited to join the Guard
battery. And so as I entered my senior year
of high school, three of us were invited to
join the Guard battery. I think I was invited
because I could do basic calculus for fire
control.
BOB SHELDON: Did you go through
Army basic training first?
LARRY WELCH: No. I went through
Guard basic training. It was all local. My
Guard battery commander was Captain
Dan Lewis, a World War II veteran. In his
day job, he was the local pharmacist. The
First Sergeant had landed in Normandy
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and was the Senior NCO in the battery. Both
were extraordinarily good leaders and trainers.
It was a very competent battery, equipped with
three 105mm howitzers mounted on armored
vehicles. We went to Guard camp each summer
for three weeks, and demonstrated that we met
the federal standards. It was serious business.
But it was also a social honor in Liberal to be in
the Guard battery.
BOB SHELDON: Was this during high
school?
LARRY WELCH: I was a senior in high
school. My first semester in college, I decided I
did not want to be a civil engineer, since I hated
engineering drawing. We didn’t have CAD
[computer-aided design] then, or I might have
become a civil engineer. We did engineering
drawings on the drawing board. So I went to
Houston to the University of Houston to study
geology. I discovered I didn’t like geology
much either. I transferred from the Kansas to
the Texas Guard but soon became aware that I
was spinning my wheels. I really didn’t know
what I wanted to do. The draft board was going
to be breathing down my neck soon. So I went
down and took the aptitude test to enlist. After
I took the test, the Army and the Air Force guys
were each trying to persuade me to come to
them. That was flattering, but I’d been in the
Army Guard and they had pegged my fun
meter. So, with the choice of a two-year enlist-
ment in the Army or a three-year enlistment in
the Air Force, I chose the Air Force. I finished
that enlistment 38 years later.
BOB SHELDON: It took you a while.
LARRY WELCH: Well, I started as an Air-
man Basic with no college degree, so I guess I
had lots of room to grow.
BOB SHELDON: What was your initial
career field or training in the Air Force?
LARRY WELCH: I had initially elected to
be an electronics technician. But while I was
waiting to go to tech school at Lowry, I served
as an assistant tactical instructor (T.I.), which
meant I was a one-striper helping a four-striper
take care of 90 new basic trainees in a course I
had just finished. One day I took my 90-man
group over to the base theater where they were
briefed on the aviation cadet program. I was
standing in the back with a lot of other bored
T.I.’s when some guy came back and handed
me a card and said, “You want to fill one of
these out?” And I said, “Sure, I’ll fill it out.” I
did and threw it in the basket. A week later I
got this urgent call from the orderly room. I had
pretty much forgotten about the card. At the
time a three-striper was considered king of the
hill. A captain was God. So when the call came
in, a three-striper came to get me and said,
“There’s a Captain Lewis waiting for you on
the phone.” Captain Lewis said, “Is this
Welch?” And I said, “Yes, sir.” And he said,
“We’ve looked over your test record, and we
think you are a good candidate for the aviation
cadet program. Are you interested?” As I
paused, he laughed and he said, “You don’t
know what I’m talking about, do you?” And I
said, “Well, no sir.” He said, “Well, let me tell
you what, Welch. Come over here for a week.
You’ll take some tests. You’ll wear civilian
clothes. You spend the nights here and you’re
off every night.” That sounded good, so I went
over, took all the tests, finished the tests, and he
said, “Well, you’re a nine seven for officer, and
a nine six for pilot, and a nine three for navi-
gator. What do you want to do?” Do you want
to be a pilot or a navigator? I looked at him and
I said, “I want to be a pilot.” And that was it. So
you can see that I had a carefully planned ca-
reer.
But my expectation continued to be that I
would serve three years and then go on with
my life—back to school to finish a degree. By
then I thought I’d grown up enough to figure
out what I really wanted to do. But as it turned
out, each time we came to a decision point,
Eunice and I would look at it and say, “Well,
we like what we’re doing.”
BOB SHELDON: Were you married when
you were an aviation cadet?
LARRY WELCH: No. Cadets weren’t al-
lowed to be married. Eunice and I were mar-
ried a year after I was commissioned. We had
dated a bit in high school by the way.
BOB SHELDON: As an aviation cadet,
what was the program like?
LARRY WELCH: The Aviation Cadet pro-
gram started with what was called “Pre-flight.”
That lasted thirteen weeks, and it was all offic-
ers training. It was essentially the same as Of-
ficer Candidate School (OCS). But it was not at
OCS. It was at the Aviation Cadet School at
Lackland Air Force Base. Next was primary
training for six months conducted, at that time,
by civilian contractors. My instructor pilot was
a WWII P-47 pilot, so I wanted to be a fighter
pilot. The final phase was six months of basic,
conducted by military instructors. On comple-
tion we graduated as a pilot and as a second
lieutenant in the Air Force Reserve, with a
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three-year obligation from the day of gradua-
tion. That added to my original three-year ob-
ligation but seemed worthwhile. I spent the
first seven years as an instructor pilot in pilot
training, instructor school, and then at Head-
quarters, Air Training Command on the stan-
dardization evaluation team checking on the
competence of flight instructors. At the time I
graduated from pilot training, I had one of the
three fighter slots for the whole class, because
they were graduating far, far more pilots than
they needed.
BOB SHELDON: How many were in the
graduating class?
LARRY WELCH: The graduating class at
my location was 120 and the program had
about a thousand. But, before I made it to the
expected fighter assignment, Air Training
Command came down with a decision to send
the top eight graduates from each location to
basic instructor school to become instructor pi-
lots. Before that, all instructor pilots had to have
operational experience. But there was a short-
age of instructors, so this was a solution. It also
seemed that somebody in authority believed
that people who just came out of pilot training
might do as well as instructors as pilots who
had been off flying fighters or bombers or other
aircraft. As it turned out, we did fine.
After I’d been instructing for about three
years, I went to Craig Air Force Base to become
an instructor in the basic instructor school—
teaching people to be instructors. We also had
the jet qualification course where, as a first
lieutenant, I was teaching colonels how to fly jet
airplanes. In that era, most of our senior pilots’
experience was in props. The jets were the F-80,
T-33, F-84, and F-86.
BOB SHELDON: Did you have any near-
death experiences with your students?
LARRY WELCH: No. I never did. Like all
instructors, I had students who seemed to be
trying to kill me, but they never came close. I
had a couple of flameouts (jet engine failures),
but we handled those. Then they decided to do
some reorganizing, and did away with the sub-
ordinate air forces in Air Training Command—
Flying Training Air Force, Crew Training Air
Force, and Technical Training Air Force, con-
solidating Flying Training and Technical Train-
ing at Air Training Command Headquarters
and splitting up crew training and sending it to
the operational commands. So they moved the
former Flying Training Air Force Standardiza-
tion Evaluation Board duties to the Basic In-
structor School Standardization Evaluation
Board at Craig Air Force Base. By that time I
was serving on that board, so as a very junior
first lieutenant, I became a member of a team
that traveled to all the pilot training bases to
evaluate instructor competence and the overall
pilot training program. That was a challenging
experience for a lieutenant.
Then one day just before New Years my
two-star boss’s office called and said to come in
and meet with the General. When I reported to
him, he said, “Look Welch, I just can’t have
lieutenants any longer running around telling
lieutenant colonels and colonels how to run
their business.” So he said, “Step up here and
I’ll fix that.” And he pinned on captain’s
bars—no waiting list, no formality. He just
pinned them on. I had absolutely no idea I was
eligible for promotion since it was a new pro-
gram called below-the-zone promotion. Only a
small percent of lieutenants with four years’
service could be selected for immediate promo-
tion to captain.
I have a little anecdote about that I still
enjoy. After I got home, I wandered around the
house with the captain bars on. Eunice asked,
“Well, how was your meeting?” I said, “It was
really good.” And she asked, “Well, are we still
going downtown?” I said, “Yeah.” She said,
“Well, are you going to change clothes?” I said,
“Not yet.” And she said, “Why not?” I said,
“Not yet.” I walked around a while, and finally
she said, “When are we going downtown?” I
said, “As soon as you notice something.” She
finally noticed. That was great fun.
I put in a request every year to go to fight-
ers. And every year my colonel or brigadier
general boss, whichever it happened to be,
would say, “Not yet.” And so finally after
seven years in training command, with the Ber-
lin crisis in play, the Air Force was forming a
new conventional-only wing in Europe. At that
time, the existing fighter wings in Europe were
focused on nuclear weapons delivery. So to
form the new wing they took some people from
other wings in Europe and shipped over some
new people from the CONUS [Continental
United States]. It was the 366th Tactical Fighter
Wing in France. We were building this wing
from scratch, one squadron on each of four
dispersed bases in France. On reporting to the
wing Deputy Commander for Operations, he
said, “I understand you’ve been flying T-38s.”
I’d been in a test force for the T-38—the new
basic trainer aircraft as it was introduced to Air
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Training Command. And I said, “That’s right,
sir.” He said, “Well, we don’t have any of
those.” I said, “I can fly anything, sir.” He said,
“Well, okay, maybe you can. But,” he said,
“what I need for you to do first is to build the
COC (Combat Operations Center). And when
you do that and we pass the NATO tactical
evaluation in six months, you can pick your
squadron.” So I was assigned to COC. He had
also just reported to the wing, from Air Defense
Command, with no European fighter experi-
ence. I asked him, “What is a COC?” He said,
“It’s behind that door. Now you know as much
as I do.” I walked in the door and found a
nearly empty room with a senior master ser-
geant, a field phone, and a field desk. Six
months later the COC was operating with all
the communications, desks, and status boards
to control the generation of forces at four bases.
We passed the NATO Tac Eval with flying
colors. So I went back in and reported to the
Colonel. He said, “It’s a waste of your time to
go down to one of those squadrons. I want to
give you a new job here. I have this major staff
position open, and I need you to do that.” It
looked like a great career move, but I said, “Sir,
I think we had a bargain.” He said, “I’ll stick by
the bargain, if you’re dumb enough to insist on
it.” I said, “I really am.”
So I went down to the squadron, and two
months later the whole wing left because Pres-
ident De Gaulle essentially forced us out, as we
were the last combat unit in France.
BOB SHELDON: What year was that?
LARRY WELCH: That would be 1963. Mil-
itary aircraft flying at 20,000 feet or below op-
erated under military control in France. That
expedited flight to ranges, et cetera. But then it
was dropped to 15,000, and then 10,000 feet,
and then ground level, which meant we had to
get clearance from France Control to even take
off. That just didn’t happen. So the Air Force
picked the whole wing up from our four bases
in France and moved us door-to-door to Hol-
loman Air Force Base in New Mexico. And we
moved four days after we were notified. When
we got to Holloman, we had to build the wing
from scratch. No real facilities—just temporary
accommodations to put us down. We had just
gotten established in a small building and
started operating from it, when my squadron
commander got a call from the Wing DO’s of-
fice saying, “We are going to have to build a
Combat Operations Center from scratch here
and Welch knows how to do that, so send him
up here to do that.” My squadron commander
knew about the deal in France, and he said,
“Don’t go.” I said, “What do you mean?” He
said, “Don’t go up there. Just stay down here
and keep flying.” So I did. I just stayed down
there and kept flying. And the Wing kept call-
ing down and saying, “Where’s Welch?” And
they’d say, “Well, he’s flying right now.”
BOB SHELDON: What aircraft were you
flying then?
LARRY WELCH: F-84s. We were the last
F-84 wing in the Air Force. And after a while, a
senior captain who started before I did said,
“I’d like to go up and be Chief of COC.” So the
squadron commander told him, “Go on. Go do
that.” So I disobeyed the order, stayed in the
squadron and deployed a lot, doing things
fighter pilots do. Shortly after that, we failed an
Operational Readiness Inspection (ORI) due to
poor strafe (air-ground gun attack) perfor-
mance. To fix the problem, the Wing formed a
special team led by the 390th Operations Offi-
cer. I was on that special team. The relationship
with that commander would come back to me
in a few years. Shortly after we passed the
re-evaluation with flying colors, the Wing
Commander called me on the phone and said,
“Congratulations, Larry,” and I said, “Well,
thank you sir, what’d I do?” He said, “You’re
on the Major’s list.” And I said, “No, sir, I’m not
eligible.” And he read my service number and
asked, “Is that you?” And I said, “Yes.” He
said, “Well, you’re on the list,” and I said,
“There’s got to be some mistake.” He said,
“Well, if it’s a mistake, too bad for them be-
cause you’re on the list.” Turned out it was a
new program—deep below the zone. And so I
was promoted to major four years before I had
any expectation of promotion.
The next big challenge was converting to
the F-4. Our first deployment was to be 120-day
rotations to Alaska to provide the capability to
reach western Alaska to intercept Soviet Bear
bombers that were probing Alaska defenses.
We converted, and had to pass an Operational
Readiness Inspection to make the deployment a
week after the ORI. But during the ORI, the
Squadron Commander had a heart attack.
BOB SHELDON: How many years did
you have in at that point?
LARRY WELCH: Eight years. After the
Squadron Commander had a heart attack the
operations officer moved up to Squadron Com-
mander because we were deploying to Alaska
in three days. And I was now the next senior
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guy in the squadron. So I became the opera-
tions officer and we deployed to Alaska. We
were supposed to be there for four months. But
after six weeks, we got direction to take our
airplanes to Hill Air Force Base to get them
painted in camouflage colors because in two
weeks we were deploying to Vietnam. So we
deployed to Vietnam and I served the standard
Vietnam tour. When I returned from Vietnam, I
went to Armed Forces Staff College.
BOB SHELDON: What kind of missions
did you fly in Vietnam?
LARRYWELCH: I flew a mix of North and
South.
BOB SHELDON: Air-to-air? Air-to-
ground?
LARRY WELCH: Air-to-ground. We flew
F-4Cs. Over time, the squadron flew about half
in the North and half in the South. Actually we
flew a lot more missions in the South. We ini-
tially deployed to Phan Rang, where we were
the only squadron operating off an expedition-
ary runway. We flew in-country missions from
Phan Rang. After five months we moved up to
Danang, where we flew both in-country and
missions over the North.
BOB SHELDON: Was the F-4 relatively
new in Vietnam when you flew it?
LARRY WELCH: We were the second F-4
wing in the Air Force. We went from being the
oldest F-84 wing to the second newest F-4 wing.
We had nothing but dumb bombs, 500-pound
Mark 82s, and 750-pound M-117s.
BOB SHELDON:Was a hundred missions
standard back then?
LARRY WELCH: The tour was either a
hundred missions in the North or a year in the
South. I had a mix of both so I completed a
one-year tour. At the end of a year, I went to
Armed Forces Staff College, which at that time
was a five and a half month intermediate
school. It was a very good experience. On com-
pleting the course, we expected to get a lot to
say about our next assignment. But when the
assignment people talked to me, they said,
“You’re going to Air Force Studies and Analy-
sis.” And I said, “Well, this has to be a mistake.
The only analysis I know anything about is
when you go to the hospital and provide a
sample in a bottle.” And he said, “No, you have
been requested by name by Air Force Studies
and Analysis, and they get whoever they
want.”
BOB SHELDON: Who made that request?
LARRYWELCH: It was the 390th Squadron
Commander that I had mentioned before. He
was in Air Force Studies and Analysis (AFSA),
where he belonged since he was well suited for
that. I mentioned earlier that he led the Wing
Team that was formed when we failed our first
ORI at Holloman. As a part of that team, I
looked at the way we were harmonizing the
guns and concluded that it was wrong. The
maintenance officer declared emphatically that
I was wrong and showed me the tech order on
harmonizing the guns. I was still convinced it
was wrong, so I calculated a new approach and
explained it to the team leader and then to the
Wing DO. The DO said, “OK Welch, we’ll try it
your way.” That may not sound earth shaking,
but here was a colonel who hoped to be a wing
commander some day and who is personally
responsible for getting ready to pass the ORI
when another failure would mean both he and
the wing commander would be out of a job.
Some young captain tells him the tech data is
wrong and explains why, and the Colonel has
the guts to say, “Lets do it.” I was very lucky to
encounter that kind of leadership.
So we put together a harmonization range
and adjusted all the guns. Strafe scores im-
proved dramatically, and then when the ORI
retake came along, lady luck appeared yet
again. The ORI rules required that half the pi-
lots perform the strafe event and half of those
achieve qualifying scores. Based on the most
recent record, the Wing Commander decided
the 389th would go first. And though I was still
a junior captain, I led the first flight to the
range. We hit the range at 5:30 in the morning,
just daylight, and the air was smooth as a ba-
by’s butt. There was not a hint of turbulence.
The airplane slid down that strafe path without
a wobble and the guns were properly harmo-
nized. So my flight of four came off the range
knowing we’d all shot at least 50% hits. 25% is
what it takes to qualify. The second flight of the
389th came off with high scores as well. Any-
way, my squadron sent sixteen airplanes across
the range, and fifteen of them qualified. That’s
half of what the wing had to have. So at the end
of that ORI, we had 82% of the pilots qualifying
strafe—which was unheard of in the F-84. So
that’s part of what impressed this Lieutenant
Colonel that pulled me, against my will, to Air
Force Studies and Analysis.
JIM BEXFIELD: You had gotten more col-
lege in the meantime, had you not?
MORS ORAL HISTORY PROJECT . . . GENERAL LARRY D WELCH
Military Operations Research, V9 N4 2004 Page 11
LARRY WELCH: I went to night school
virtually constantly—in France, in Texas, in
New Mexico, in Maryland, and so on. When I
finally earned my undergraduate degree I had
170 credits, had served as the Chief of the
Fighter Division, and had just been promoted
to colonel. I had three years towards engineer-
ing with lots of math and lots of science.
I was told later by a lieutenant colonel in
Air Force Personnel that, when I was selected
below the zone for major, there were four peo-
ple on the below-the-zone list that did not have
an undergraduate degree. General LeMay
scratched three of them off the list. The reason he
didn’t scratch me off is that virtually every eval-
uation report (ER) in my file said something
about going to night school to earn a degree.
When I arrived at Studies and Analysis, I
went to the Fighter Division. And the first sub-
ject that came up was a technical subject. I’d
only been there a week and I did a paper on it,
and gave the paper to my boss, who was a
lieutenant colonel. He gave it to the Division
Chief, a colonel who sent it up to the two-star
and the two-star called me up.
BOB SHELDON: This is General Kent?
LARRY WELCH: No, it wasn’t Kent yet. It
was Major General Davis. He asked, “Where’d
you learn all this?” And I said, “Just stuff that
fighter pilots know, sir.” And he said, “Doesn’t
look like fighter pilot knowledge.” And I said,
“Well, it is.” He said, “Maybe so, but not all
fighter pilots can write like that, so now you are
revealed.”
BOB SHELDON: What was the subject of
that paper?
LARRY WELCH: It had to do with putting
a set of sensors in the nose of an airplane, and
I pointed out all the reasons why it was a really
lousy idea. Wrong environment, et cetera. And
so they sent that on up to the Air Force Vice
Chief, and the Vice Chief said, “Okay, we won’t
do that.” It was just a happenstance. It was a
subject I thoroughly understood. I knew how to
write. It was a decision that had to be made
very quickly, but other people in the Division
didn’t have any idea how to address the sub-
ject. And this young major, new to the job,
gives them a paper that lets everybody off the
hook. It could have been a thousand other sub-
jects and I wouldn’t have had a clue. So, once
again, luck played a powerful role.
BOB SHELDON: You were a little sur-
prised at being assigned to Studies and Analy-
sis. Did you have a preferred assignment?
LARRY WELCH: Oh, yes. At the time, I’m
a major and a fighter pilot who just finished a
tour in Vietnam. I expect to go back to fighter
business and probably back to Vietnam. That’s
what was supposed to happen to young majors
who are fighter pilots.
BOB SHELDON: Flying was your first
love?
LARRY WELCH: Sure. I worked long and
hard to get into fighters. But the new assign-
ment was clearly the right one and had a lot to
do with defining my future. The air-to-air
branch of the Fighter Division was assigned the
task of creating a simulation to evaluate design
parameters in fighter airplanes. The core idea
was to design for dogfighting because that was
thought to be the most demanding set of design
parameters. And some analyst at North Amer-
ican came up with the concept to simulate the
fighter pilot decision processes and mechanize
those decision processes to evaluate design pa-
rameters using one-on-one dogfights to build
trade-off curves. The project wasn’t getting
anywhere, so they decided to bring in a couple
of fighter pilots who could explain to the com-
puter programmers how fighter pilots make
decisions in air-to-air combat. I found out then
that was why I was there. The Lieutenant Colo-
nel had asked for me because he thought I
could explain fighter tactics to computer pro-
grammers. Turned out he was wrong. I don’t
think anyone could. We tried that for about
three weeks and I decided it just was not going
to work.
So I sat down with a Fortran 4 self-taught
course and figured out how to program a com-
puter. Then we figured out how to tell the
computer what to do. We moved a three-
dimensional aim point in front of the airplane
around, relating it to the three-dimensional aim
point of the opposing airplane using a set of
Monte Carlo decision rules.
We went to the Fighter Weapons School at
Nellis Air Force Base and gave a quiz to a set of
fighter weapons instructors. We asked, “If you
have this condition, described in terms of posi-
tion and overtake, what would you do?” And
from that, we constructed a table of maneuvers
for each set of relative conditions between air-
craft.
Eight months later, after truly 15-hour
days, taking only Christmas and New Year’s
off, we delivered a program where two F-4s
would produce believable curves. We were
able to validate with two airplanes at Eglin Air
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Force Base. We configured one at lightweight
with full power available. For the other aircraft,
we restricted the afterburner to vary thrust-to-
weight ratio and varied the weight to adjust
wing loading. And we duplicated an appropri-
ate set of curves from the simulation. So that
gave the model enough credibility to use it to
define the best set of design parameters.
But then we put in the data for new design
airplanes. We put in an FX airplane, and the
results were just garbage. The tactics and the
decision processes that worked for the F-4,
when used with what became the F-15, were
just garbage. We discovered that we didn’t
know how to use an airplane that could pump
energy out of the fuel tanks as fast as you could
use it. Hence, for example, where the F-4
needed to do a high-speed yo-yo, the F-15 pilot
could just pull back and turn a square corner
and still sustain maneuver energy.
So we then used the simulation to learn
F-15 tactics. By the way, there weren’t any plot-
ters in those days. We would scan down the
columns of numbers in huge printouts—look-
ing at angle off, closure rates, et cetera. We had
to build a picture in our heads. I used to go
home at night feeling like my brain had been
twisted. We had top priority in the computer
center—all the computer time we needed. The
curves produced from the simulation indicated
that the most cost-effective F-15 would weigh
40,000 pounds, have a wing loading of 65 and a
thrust-to-weight ratio of 1.2. The F-15A that
was delivered weighed 39,500 pounds, had a
wing loading of 66, and a thrust-to-weight ratio
of 1.15.
BOB SHELDON: This is was the days of
punch cards too?
LARRY WELCH: Yes. We had two 5,000-
card boxes that we carried to the computer
center. And remember program line numbers
are not sequential in Fortran 4, so if you drop a
box of punch cards, you’re in deep kimchi. We
did.
Then we did the F-16. A different set of
parameters. The simulation output said the
F-16 should have a wing loading of 65 and a
thrust-to-weight ratio of 1.35. The model was
called Tac Avenger at that time. I believe Air
Force analysis still uses a modern son of Tac
Avenger (part of Brawler). An interesting as-
pect of the experience of building the simula-
tion was the need to use the computer simula-
tion to learn about the tactics for new airplanes,
while the tactics for new airplanes taught us
how to do the decision process. So this closed
loop iteration—between learning tactics from
the computer and teaching the computer from
the tactics—produced a new way of thinking.
BOB SHELDON: Is this a predecessor
model to Tac Brawler?
LARRY WELCH: Yes. I believe it’s still a
piece of Tac Brawler.
JIM BEXFIELD:Was there an issue having
to do with the afterburner on the F-15? In other
words, how fast it needed to go?
LARRY WELCH: That was the top speed
issue—a big top speed issue. The Vice Chief of
Staff of the Air Force was a fighter pilot’s
fighter pilot. He believed in high speed. He
said, “Look, the Foxbat does Mach 2.7 and you
say this airplane only has to do 2.5. I don’t
believe 2.5 is as good as 2.7.” So we had to do a
lot of analysis for the Vice Chief and show him
how a 2.5 airplane could defeat an airplane
designed for 2.7—the Foxbat. Then we showed
him the challenge of going from 2.5 to 2.7. A
Mach 2.5 airframe can be aluminum. For 2.7, it
has to be stainless steel or titanium.
And we showed him the cost both in dol-
lars and weight and maneuvering performance
of having to do the trade-offs going to stainless
steel and titanium. So he finally said, “Well,
Welch,” by then I was a lieutenant colonel, “I
think you’re full of crap, but I can’t prove it,
and I can’t take the risk, so we’re going to go
with 2.5.” After that there were several other
opportunities to help with a problem facing the
Vice Chief.
The conventional wisdom was that General
Meyer never smiled. I saw him almost smile
one time. We got into the big controversy about
the lightweight fighter. Air Force Studies and
Analysis handled the job of advocacy for the
F-15 after we did the analysis because General
Ryan was disappointed with the performance
of the Advanced Concepts Division under the
Assistant Chief of Staff for Research and Devel-
opment (RDQ). We were in trouble on the Hill,
and RDQ didn’t seem to be able to deal with it.
So General Ryan gave that job to General Glenn
Kent, and General Kent gave it to the Fighter
Division. By now I’m the Chief of the Fighter
Division even though I’m just a lieutenant colo-
nel. And so we had that particular task, and at
the same time we had done some analysis that
said there’s no way we’d ever be able to replace
all of the F-4s with F-15s. Too many F-4s and
F-15s were going to be too expensive. From
that, the idea of high-low mix was born with a
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lightweight fighter as the low part of the mix—
which became the F-16. A kind of a fighter pilot
mafia developed to promote the lightweight
fighter. It included a couple of us in Studies and
Analysis, a couple of guys in RDQ, and a colo-
nel from the Deputy Chief of Staff for Opera-
tions (XO). So we did the analysis and finally
got a brief to a brigadier general in XO. And he
said, “I think you guys are right. We’ve got to
take this on up.” Then we got it to a two-star.
When he said, “I agree with you,” we put his
name on it and we got it to a three-star. And the
three-star, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Re-
search and Development, went through the
ceiling. He said, “You’re undermining the F-15.
You’re saying we can use this lightweight air-
plane for part of the force. That undermines our
plans for the F-15.” And despite us being ma-
jors and lieutenant colonels, we knew that the
three-star was dead wrong.
So we continued the fighter pilots’ under-
ground and by hook or crook got the briefing
on the Chief’s calendar. So as the big day ar-
rives, General Kent is on leave, other members
of the underground have indeed gone under-
ground and Lieutenant Colonel Welch gets to
stand up there with a 10 slide briefing facing a
panel chaired by the Chief of Staff to deliver the
message that we can’t replace all these wings of
F-4s with F-15s, and so we need a high-lowmix.
On the third chart, General John D. Ryan
stood up and said, “You are messing with the
family jewels, Welch. Who told you to do this?”
And I said, “Sir, nobody told me to do this. I’m
the Chief of the Fighter Division. This is what
I’m supposed to do.” I thought he was ready to
stomp out when J.C. Meyer took the cigar out
of his mouth, looked up at the Chief, and said,
“Chief, you know, Welch has briefed me a
number of times, and he’s not very good, but
his briefings are short. And since we’re here,
maybe we ought to hear the rest of the brief-
ing.” So Ryan turned around and sat down,
and we finished the ten slides. Then I was smart
enough to quickly get out from behind the po-
dium and sit down on the side, out of the line of
fire.
Ryan looked at Meyer and said, “Do you
agree with this?” And Meyer said, “I think it’s
dead-on, Chief. I think that’s what you’re going
to have to do.” And Ryan said, “How did we
get this far down the path without knowing
this?” And Meyer said, “Chief, I guess we just
weren’t ready to face up to it.”
Anyway, as he was walking out, Ryan
stopped in front of me with his nose about four
inches from mine. And he said, “Why weren’t
we this smart a long time ago?” As J.C. Meyer
came by, it was the only time I ever saw from
him what looked like it might have been a
smile. As I’m walking down the hall, General
Ryan’s exec stops me in the hall and says, “He
wants to see you.” And I thought, “Oh, crap,
here it comes.” I thought I’d survived and here
it comes.
So I go into General Ryan’s office—he’s a
very brusque guy—tending to talk in machine
gun bursts. So I walked in his office, and he
said, “Sit down, Welch.” So I sat down. And he
went to a small cabinet, which by the way was
still there when I became Chief, and a bottle of
whiskey was still in it. Anyway, he poured a
shot glass full, brought it over, put it on the
table, and said, “Drink it. You need it.” And I
did, and he said, “Go back to work.” That was
a message that I understood clearly and appre-
ciated for the rest of my military career.
Anyway, my point is that in all of these
things I happened to be in places, time after
time, when there was some really urgent need
to do something that was very different. And it
just happened to fit. So then I was supposed to
go to some college, Air University I guess. And
General Kent told me I couldn’t go. So I went
from a three-year tour to a four-year tour, to a
five-year tour. And finally when I was pro-
moted to colonel, he released me to go to the
National War College. I was class of ’71. Com-
ing out of National War College was the one
time when a colonel has a lot to say about
where he or she goes.
JIM BEXFIELD: Before you go on, would
you talk about your relationship with Glenn
Kent?
LARRY WELCH: There’s only one General
Glenn Kent. My first experience with him was
explaining the plan to create Tac Avenger. At
that time he was not the head of AFSA. He was
the Assistant Chief of Staff (ACS) of something
at Systems Command. He was also dual-hatted
in an R&D job in the Pentagon.
So he came over to hear a briefing on our
approach. He knew he was going to be the ASC
Studies and Analysis. I didn’t. He came over for
the briefing because we were doing it for Sys-
tems Command. And, for what seemed like a
long time during the briefing, I find I am just
not getting through to him—he keeps stopping
me when I would refer to a situation as “a
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barrel roll situation” or “a high-speed yo-yo
situation.” I put up a chart that showed the
situations and then the Monte Carlo approach
to the pilot’s decision process. He would say,
“Can’t be a barrel roll situation. The guy’s do-
ing a high speed yo-yo.” We got hung up on
that for thirty minutes. He wouldn’t turn loose
of it. He understood, but he wouldn’t turn loose
of it. And finally I took the slide and a marker
and changed all those definitions to A, B, C, D,
E, F, G. He laughed and said, “You finally got
the message.” His point, which I never forgot,
was that logic extends to language and the
briefer’s job is not just to convey the briefer’s
understanding. It is to provide understanding
to those being briefed. Anyway, that was my
first experience with him but certainly not the
last.
He had this new concept in mind, a sort of
master air warfare model. The task of bringing
together this overall warfare model fell to Leon
Goodson to work on. At that time I was still in
the air-to-air group. And then when the Colo-
nel who ran the Fighter Division left, he ap-
pointed me as the Chief of the Fighter Division,
and his expectations just went up and up and
up. But he was always perfectly willing to work
the problem with you. General Kent didn’t just
say what many other general officers had to
say, “I don’t understand that. I don’t think
that’s good enough. That won’t sell.” He would
sit down and tell you what was wrong with it.
He couldn’t always tell you how to solve it, but
he told you what was wrong with it. So I really
enjoyed working for Glenn Kent, but he prob-
ably is the second-most demanding boss I ever
had.
BOB SHELDON: Who was the first?
LARRYWELCH: The first was General Bill
Creech. That was much later. Bill Creech was
perhaps the politest, nicest boss you could
have, but also the most demanding. Demand-
ing the most in the way of analytical thought
and results. And General Kent was a gamer. He
would almost rather game you into something
than just have you agree with him. I had a
long-standing goal of getting a briefing through
Glenn Kent without him changing it. I once
took him a three-slide presentation that did
what it needed to do, and that was as austere as
possible, which is what he liked. He didn’t like
anything extra on a slide. He wanted every-
thing on that slide to convey information. So I
took this precise, carefully constructed three-
slide presentation to him. He made 17 changes
on three slides. But he had a wonderful way to
live simultaneously with reality and with very
high integrity that allowed his people to work
in an unfettered way. No one else could tell us
how to do a study. No one could tell us any-
thing about our results, but they did get to
decide what they did with it. So it wasn’t even
a compromise. It was a way to allow people to
work with very high integrity and maintain
support for them across the whole enterprise.
With this approach, leaders did not have to
worry about being sandbagged by Air Force
Studies and Analysis, because they owned the
results. In short, the customer gets to ask the
questions and owns the results. The analysts
get to provide the answers. So how it’s used is
a matter of the customer’s conscience. So we
produced a couple of studies that were really
good that went on the shelf because they were
very much contrary to the Air Force position of
the time.
JIM BEXFIELD: Can you mention what
those were?
LARRY WELCH: I can’t remember them.
They weren’t that important, because we pro-
duced a lot of other studies that were contrary
to the Air Force position that changed that Air
Force position. That was a very active era for
analysts. While I was in Fighter Division, we
did underlying rationale and support studies
on the F-15, the F-16, the A-10, the F-4G, the
EF-111, and the AWACS. It may sound strange
that AWACS is in that group, but that’s where
it was.
JIM BEXFIELD: As I recall, there were
around two hundred and some people in Stud-
ies and Analysis, and probably about thirty in
the Fighter Division?
LARRY WELCH: We had 37 analysts in
Fighter Division in five study areas. There was
the Air Superiority branch, which is where I
was until I became Division Chief. There was
also Close Air Support, Interdiction, Electronic
Warfare, and Munitions. In addition, we had
what we called the “fire drill team”—a small
team of people who could go off to solve some
immediate problem. And a bit later, we had
Leon Goodson’s branch doing the big picture
analysis and simulation work. By the time I had
left the Air Superiority branch, we had—and
remember, this is before Power Point—two
four-drawer filing cabinets full of slides. We
could create about any briefing on any subject
by adding maybe two or three new slides to
those from the cabinet.
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JIM BEXFIELD: You must have made ex-
tensive use of the graphics shop.
LARRY WELCH: That was another story.
We had great graphics support but even so, at
the time, it took a couple of days to get graphics
done. At most places it took a couple of weeks.
But as I said, we had unlimited computer time.
We had the very first desktop cathode ray
tube—monitor—capability in the Air Force.
The first time I sat down at a GE-635 computer
with a CRT, typed in the program, ran the
program, and saw the results immediately on a
monitor screen, I thought, “This is a miracle.”
JIM BEXFIELD:When you left Studies and
Analysis to go to National War College, did
you feel like you wanted to do more work in
the field of analysis?
LARRY WELCH: I realized, based on the
time I had spent in Studies and Analysis, the
value of an analytical group. But when the
Colonels Group asked what I wanted to do, I
said, “I want to be a Deputy Commander for
Operations (DCO).” And they said, “What
command?” I said, “I don’t care.” And they
said, “What airplane?” I said, “I don’t care.”
And they said, “What continent?” I said, “I
don’t care. I just want to be a Deputy Com-
mander for Ops.” So they gave me what I
thought was the best DCO job in the Air
Force—the DCO at George Air Force Base. At
George, we had two operational F-4 squadrons,
two U.S. Replacement Training Unit (RTU)
training F-4 squadrons running crews through
to get them to Vietnam, and two operational
F-105G Wild-Weasel squadrons. So when I sat
down in the DCO chair, I was dealing with five
different models of airplanes—four models of
the F-4 and the F-105G. We were also a jumping
off point for squadrons deploying to Vietnam.
So it was a complicated operation that couldn’t
be run by the seat of my pants. I formed a
two-person analysis shop. Both members re-
tired as general officers, so it worked for the
wing and it worked for them. We applied anal-
ysis to all sorts of problems. But, like all great
jobs, that came to an end as I was elevated to a
necessary, but not great, job—Vice Wing Com-
mander.
After about a year as Vice, General Dixon’s
secretary called and said, “Hold for General
Dixon.” At the time some people were fright-
ened to death of General Dixon. He was known
as the Tidewater Alligator. Dixon never started
a phone call with “Hello” or ended it with
“Good-bye.” His entire conversation was,
“Welch, I’ll be at Cannon tomorrow. Mountain
Home the next day. Meet me. Your choice.”
End of conversation. So I flew to Cannon. I was
standing in front of the wing headquarters
when the Wing Commander brought Dixon in
from the flight line.
BOB SHELDON: Dixon was a four-star at
this point?
LARRY WELCH: He was Commander of
TAC [Tactical Air Command], and had just
fired a two-star and a wing commander. But he
walks up, punches me lightly in the ribs and
says, “Let’s go in and talk.” Then he says, “No,
wait a minute. Let’s go listen to this damned
briefing and then we’ll talk.” So he’s being
briefed on the many F-111 problems at Cannon,
and every few minutes he would turn around
and throw me a softball to respond to. I’d never
met the guy. He had a terrible reputation, and
here he was throwing me big softballs that only
an idiot wouldn’t know how to answer. So he
was playing a game, which I didn’t understand
at all, and I wondered what happened to the
alligator image.
When we were alone, he said, “Okay,
Welch, here’s the deal. I know that you told the
12th Air Force Commander that he’s driving the
wing off a cliff, and that the wing cannot con-
tinue to operate at that level, and if they don’t
back off, it’s going to collapse. And I know he
told you that if you don’t have the kind of
leadership at George that can handle that, he’d
get some new leadership.” I thought how in the
hell does he know that? I knew the 12th Air
Force Commander didn’t tell him that. And he
said, “Of course, I know you’re right. And I
know your wing commander can’t do what he
needs to do. And I know your numbered Air
Force Commander doesn’t knowwhat he needs
to do. So I have to get you out of there. I want
you to come to TAC Headquarters to command
the first F-15 wing. But I don’t need you to do
that until next year. So in the meantime, I want
you to help me with some big problems that I
need a Larry Welch to solve.” And then I knew
what was going on. He was a great admirer of
Glenn Kent. So I said, “Sir, you’ve been talking
to General Kent.” And he looked at me and he
said, “That’s right.” He said, “But I was DCS
Personnel when you were in the Pentagon.” He
said, “So don’t think that Glenn Kent’s the first
time I’ve known you.” So the fact is that Dixon
spent a lot of time going through personnel
records of majors and lieutenant colonels look-
ing for certain kinds of officers. This was mid
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’74. But I was obligated to tell him, “Look, I
have to tell you that I’ve got a strange EKG on
my last physical. I have to go down to Brooks
for a full evaluation.” He said, “Well, should I
worry about that?” I said, “I don’t know.” He
said, “How are you feeling?” I said, “I feel
great.” He said, “Well, you look like you’re in
good shape. People tell me you have an enor-
mous amount of energy, so we’ll worry about
that (the physical issue) when we need to.”
So I went to work for him as a special
assistant with an office next to his (though sig-
nificantly more modest). He wanted me to form
a small group to put together something he
called integrated concepts of operation. So I put
together a team, one of whom was Mike Ryan,
John D. Ryan’s son, that I called my Mission
Impossible team, and it was. The purpose of
these integrated concepts of operation was to
explain to people how systems worked to-
gether. System of systems was not yet in ana-
lytical vogue but he understood that we needed
to start thinking that way. The first integrated
concept pulled together the F-4G Wild Weasel,
EF-111 electronic jammer aircraft, the AWACS,
and munitions to show the integrated approach
to defense suppression. And we came up with
a methodology and a way to portray this, and
after some long Saturday morning sessions, he
fell in love with the approach and the results.
Eventually a lot of other people did too.
But then it came time for me to go to
Brooks, and he called me into his office. He
said, “What is this piece of paper about?” It was
from Brooks and required that, as my supervi-
sor, he provide his evaluation of me before the
medical evaluation. So he said, “Don’t you find
this a strange process?” And I said, “Yes, sir, I
certainly do.” And he said, “Well, okay,” and
then he handed me a handwritten note and he
said, “This is what I think I’ll tell them. You
look at that and tell me if you think that’s
alright.” The note said, “Dear General . . .” (to
the two-star at Brooks Medical Center), “While
I find this a very strange process, I’m willing to
participate. That said, so far as I can determine,
Welch is healthy. He works harder than almost
anyone else I know. He is certainly more pro-
ductive than most anyone else I know. So if you
discover that he’s alright, that’s great. If you
find he’s not alright, then I expect you to tell me
what you need to do to make him alright.” So
when I got down to Brooks, my first appoint-
ment was with the Commander. He showed me
the letter, not knowing I’d seen it. He said,
“You’ve really got a champion there.” And he
said, “Now you know this is not going to make
a bit of difference in your evaluation.” And I
said, “I didn’t expect it would.” But anyway,
I came out of their evaluation in good shape. I
just had a slightly different electrical system
than was considered normal.
BOB SHELDON: Did they say in what re-
spect it was different?
LARRYWELCH: The specifics are not very
interesting and they really couldn’t figure it all
out, but I stayed with the treadmill until they
got bored. Since then, the diagnostic capability
has advanced to the point they can tell you
more of the why and it presents no added risk.
And I went back the second year. I was willing
to do it because I understood they were build-
ing a database to be able to understand it, so the
next time there’s some young captain that has
this condition, he doesn’t get grounded. I be-
lieve that at the time, had they been able to
detect those symptoms when I was a major, I
would have been grounded. So I was willing to
participate.
Anyway, my job with Dixon was pure anal-
ysis. Really hard, tough, conceptual, ”how do
you think about this?” As I said, “system-of-
systems” wasn’t even in the vernacular. As a
piece of this, we invented a way to evaluate
things using a double Delphi approach that
was adopted as the basis of Checkmate’s work.
A lieutenant colonel working for me when I
was the Deputy for Operational Plans (XP)
dreamed it up, or at least how to apply it to this
class of analytical problem, and then a small
team exploited it. So the XP organization at
TAC was very much in the analysis business.
JIM BEXFIELD: You said that General
Dixon said you had a lot of energy. What was
your typical day like?
LARRY WELCH: Dixon was an interesting
boss. I really liked Dixon—personally—though
I avoided social relations with someone that
senior to me. I just didn’t play that game. And
when he retired he complained to Eunice that I
would never even drink a beer with him. But
I liked him. I traveled with him a lot. And I
watched him lose his temper, and I watched
him behave in ways that I thought were totally
unnecessary. But he was a good leader and he
was 100% corporate Air Force. It was never
about TAC. It was always about the Air Force.
And he had a heart of gold. He really did.
I characterize Dixon as lots of bark and not
much bite. I characterize Bill Creech as all bite
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and no bark. And I worked for five years for
Dixon in various capacities, and five years for
Bill Creech. I worked directly for them and
helped them solve complex problems. As
planned, after a year with Dixon, I took the
First Wing, then came back to work for Dixon,
first as Inspector General and then Deputy for
Plans (XP) when I was promoted to brigadier
two years later.
BOB SHELDON: Let’s talk about the First
Wing. Did you use some of the knowledge you
gained from doing the F-15 study in Studies
and Analysis?
LARRY WELCH: Well, not at first. That’s
kind of entertaining because when I first went
down there as Wing Commander there’s this
new airplane that has such high energy maneu-
verability, that it can melt you into the floor-
boards, so physical conditioning and physical
stamina is really important. So I watched F-15
guys go from spending time at the bar at happy
hour to going to the weight room and playing
tennis because every mission was physically
demanding. By this time, I’m a 36-year-old
colonel. With these young sports, for the first
six months, I could win the air-to-air encoun-
ters most of the time because I knew this air-
plane. My actual time in the airplane was about
a hundred hours, but I had thousands of hours
with this airplane in simulations. But after
about six months, I noticed that I started losing.
After a year, I decided I didn’t want to play
these games anymore. So from that standpoint,
what the first Studies and Analysis experience
really did was hone the mental processes. I
wouldn’t have done well in Studies and Anal-
ysis in the first place if I hadn’t had some apti-
tude for that, but there was enormous growth
from the experience. There is a set of expres-
sions that I dislike. One is, “That sounds about
right.” I don’t want to know what it sounds
like. I want to know what it is, at least to the
limit of our ability to know.
With General Creech we embarked on a
new series of operational concepts, which led to
new systems and new ways of fighting and
operating. The LANTIRN (low-altitude naviga-
tion and targeting infrared night) box came out
of one such analysis. By then I was TAC Deputy
for Operations (DO) but my jobs seemed al-
ways to call for the analytical approach.
We did genuine gap analysis. When we
started, I’d never heard the term—never heard
the concept. We started with conceptual ideas
about what kind of capability we needed and
gap analysis to address needs. And then a su-
perb partnership between General Creech and
the commander of Air Force Systems Com-
mand, General Al Slay, produced remarkable
progress in defining, programming, and deliv-
ering a more complete set of tactical air capa-
bilities. General Slay would put a group of his
XR guys to work with our people to find solu-
tions to the gaps. That’s how the LANTIRN box
came to be. Compass Call came from a gap
analysis. The issue was how to dismantle the
Warsaw Pact integrated air defense so that we
could penetrate and do what we needed to do?
That need is also what led to the F-117. Our
initial interest in the 117 was to take out the
SA-5s. We had to have something that could get
in there and use area munitions to wipe out
those SA-5s before we could get the attack air-
craft through. So all of those systems came from
gap analysis. They came from a partnership
with Systems Command. We also had a long-
range strike program. That led to the F-15E. The
need was for true all-weather precision strike.
The answer was the F-15E. And again, that
came from that same partnership with Air
Force Systems Command, which unfortunately
doesn’t exist any more and is sorely missed.
BOB SHELDON: What was your assign-
ment after working for General Creech?
LARRY WELCH: While I was TAC/DO,
the idea of a rapid deployment joint task force
(RDJTF) took shape. President Carter decided
that we needed a capability to respond in
places where we didn’t have a presence. Con-
gress provided some funding and dictated the
formation of the RDJTF, which later became
Central Command (CENTCOM). They put an
old War College classmate of mine in charge of
the RDJTF (Marine Lieutenant General P.X.
Kelly) and I became Commander of 9th Air
Force. But my main assignment was to form the
Rapid Deployment Air Force (RDAFFOR) com-
ponent of the RDJTF. The only hope that RDJTF
had of performing the assigned mission was to
focus all the available air power on the situa-
tion, because the task was to stop a Russian
invasion of Iran north of the Zagros Mountains.
That was the 1002 plan, which evolved to the
1004 plan that was applied with some modifi-
cation to Iraq in 1991.
JIM BEXFIELD: Same plan?
LARRY WELCH: Same basis. But instead
of Iran it was Iraq. Instead of Russia in Iran, it
was Iraq in Kuwait. So we had to build the
RDAFFOR from scratch to support the RDJTF
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mission of defending Iran from a Soviet inva-
sion. We wrote the operations plan at 9th Air
Force. It was a fascinating experience. At that
time the 9th Air Force senior staff tended to be
older colonels who were not competitive for
promotion to general officer. But when they got
the job of forming RDAFFOR and coming up
with concepts of how to quickly respond with
focused airpower, I found this group of colo-
nels had done and could do almost anything
and they thoroughly enjoyed it. They could run
circles around the more prestigious TAC staff
because they appreciated the opportunity to
contribute. They played golf hard on the week-
ends. But the rest of the time they just worked.
So we put together the plans to support the
RDJTF. We invented “back yard” training ca-
pabilities so we could train realistically with the
Navy and with the Army. We formed a special
relationship with the Commander of the 24th
Infantry Division at Fort Stewart to do joint
training. He prepared an austere airfield, where
we would operate A-10s in support of ground
operations. The 9th AF tactical control people
would operate in garrison, but connected so
they could practice controlling air operations
using our daily training flights. And we learned
how to work together. The Commander of the
24th Infantry Division was Major General Jack
Galvin, who eventually became SACEUR [Su-
preme Allied Commander, Europe]. We were
full partners in our daily operations. And I
knew Lieutenant General P.X. Kelly, Com-
mander, RDJTF, well and we got along well,
again in full partnership. The Army component
commander was a corps commander. He didn’t
have much of a staff planning capability. The
maritime commander was a one-star admiral
out in Hawaii, Stan Arthur who later became
full Admiral Stan Arthur. At the time, he had
neither forces nor staff. The Marine Force
(MARFOR) commander was a one-star out of
Camp Pendleton, California.
So the formation of the RDJTF, which be-
came CENTCOM, rested in P.X. Kelley’s head-
quarters and my headquarters. We built the
plans and capabilities from scratch—with new
deployment concepts and new concepts for
joint fires. The challenge was to stop the Rus-
sians with absolutely minimal friendly ground
forces in place. That meant we had to attack the
Russians in their most vulnerable area, which
was in the northwestern mountain passes. To
reach those areas, we needed B-52s. So we went
to the Strategic Air Command (SAC) and got
agreement that we could put some needed new
munitions on the B-52s and operate them out of
bases in Europe. Those concepts came from
more gap analysis. Again, the gap analysis
identified what was missing in capability to do
what we needed to be able to do. Then it took
partnerships to figure out how to do it. Fortu-
nately we had a good relationship with the
Strategic Air Command DO who had worked
for me before. So when he took proposed solu-
tions to his four-star boss, we got concurrence
and action.
BOB SHELDON: At some point of time in
the Air Force there was a lot of friction between
SAC and TAC. Evidently you were able to
overcome this?
LARRYWELCH: That pre-dated all of this.
I don’t know the history, but Dixon and Ellis
(CINCSAC) were good friends. There were an-
imosities elsewhere. TAC and MAC [Military
Airlift Command] didn’t get along well. So that
meant that the MAC DO, who was an Armed
Forces Staff College classmate, and I had to
solve TAC-MAC problems that should have
been addressed by our four-star bosses. Gen-
eral Moore retired a week before Dixon did. So
the day that Dixon retired, the MAC DO and I
signed a TAC-MAC document in their name
that had been held up for a year. As far as I
know, it’s still in force. I believe the statute of
limitations has expired on that confession. So
relationships did make a lot of difference in
getting things done.
I spent a couple of years at 9th AF then
came back up to the Air Staff as the Deputy
Chief of Staff (DCS) for Programs and Re-
sources. The DCS Programs and Resources was
responsible for putting together the Air Force
POM—collecting all the inputs from the com-
mands and putting the program together for
the Chief and Secretary. And that’s a complex
job. How to value things and how to make
things fit. How to think about cost effectiveness
in a world that tended to know the cost of
everything and the effectiveness of nothing—so
lots of interface with OSD/PA&E [the Office of
Program Analysis and Evaluation in the Office
of the Secretary of Defense]. By the way, I was
and am a believer in the PA&E function to
include an adversarial relationship with the
Services. Oftentimes there were people in
PA&E that I was not fond of and they took
positions that I thought were bad positions, but
I thought that having an independent group of
people improved our analysis. It motivated us
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to do our homework. As a consequence, we
understood our business much better than I
think we otherwise would have. We challenged
each other much more than we would have had
we not had to deal with first OSD Systems
Analysis and then OSD/PA&E.
JIM BEXFIELD:Now Studies and Analysis
was under you at that point?
LARRY WELCH: No.
JIM BEXFIELD: It was still an independent
organization reporting to the chief?
LARRY WELCH: Yes.
JIM BEXFIELD: Was it Jasper Welch who
was in charge of it at that time?
LARRY WELCH: Jasper was later, but be-
fore Jasper, the character of Air Force Studies
and Analysis changed to being more reluctant
to challenge Air Force positions with analysis.
When I moved from Programs and Resources
to Vice Chief, I took on the task of restoring Air
Force Studies and Analyses, though we could
not build it back to what it was, but at least
we—in my view—ensured that they returned
to their heritage. And by then we were getting
a lot better analysis from the commands, so we
didn’t quite need the power in a central studies
and analysis that we needed when Glenn Kent
was running it. This was in contrast to the kind
of analysis we used to get from the commands.
I remember when we took a matrix on the
future fighter down to the TAC staff. We
showed this matrix of capabilities, from a
25,000-pound day VFR [Visual Flight Rules]
air-to-air only to an 81,000-pound all-weather,
air-to-air, air-to-ground aircraft. Our analysis
said that the 40,000-pound, all-weather, air-to-
air machine with rudimentary air-to-ground ca-
pability was best. The TAC staff listened to the
presentation and the TAC Deputy for Require-
ments (DR), who was supposed to be smart,
said, “Well, we don’t really need the briefing. I
can look at that matrix and I can tell what
airplane we want. We want that one in the
upper right hand corner (81,000 pounds).” He
said, “Good big airplane is better than a good
little airplane.” And Colonel John Boyd (typi-
cally irreverent) said, “No, No, General, that’s
not airplanes. That’s football players.” The DR
stomped out of the room. We never gave the
briefing to TAC. And the Air Force developed
and fielded the 40,000-pound version.
By the way, years later, I made one of the
early flights at Edwards Air Force Base in a new
version of the F-15. My takeoff weight was
81,000 pounds—a fully loaded F-15E. So we
ended up with some good big airplanes, but not
until we had a lot of 40,000 pound airplanes
that served for decades as the world’s most
capable air superiority fighter. And we also
developed and fielded a lot of the low end of
the matrix—aircraft weighing something less
than 30,000 pounds—the F-16 family.
Initially the F-16 was day only. Day, night,
clear air. Air-to-air and air-to-ground.
BOB SHELDON: John Boyd with his “en-
ergy fights,” did he affect the Studies and Anal-
ysis arguments?
LARRY WELCH: Oh, yes. John and I
worked together hand in glove for years on
these issues. John was in RDQ. When the chief
moved the FX analysis and advocacy task from
RDQ to AFSA, we formed a 5-man team and I
was the Studies and Analysis guy. The Briga-
dier General in charge was from RDQ. John
Boyd was also RDQ and there were two guys
from OPS. But John Boyd was deep into energy
maneuverability analysis so he’d lay out all his
plots and we were in total harmony on the F-15.
John was the guy that had the task in Systems
Command of defining the FX, and we gave a
joint Boyd-Welch briefing more than 60 times.
We were in harmony on the FX.
We were not in harmony on the lightweight
fighter. John had become convinced that the
lightweight fighter had to have a thrust-to-
weight ratio of at least 1.6. And he was irritated
because our analysis said that’s a waste of
money. We don’t need it. We don’t have an
engine that can do that. We would have to
develop another new engine, which was a very
long, risky enterprise. As an example of the
engine development challenge in those days,
the reliability and maintainability of the early
F-15 engines were terrible. Wonderful perfor-
mance, but terrible durability. We were sup-
posed to get 600 tactical cycles (idle to full
power and back) out of the engine. We were
getting 150 before having to do major overhaul.
At one time, while I was 1st TFW commander,
we had 140 airplanes on the ramp and 92 holes
(missing engines). So I had no interest in creat-
ing an artificial need for a new engine. I knew if
we had to put a new engine development in the
F-16, it would delay that airplane another six
years. And we needed it. We needed to replace
those F-4s. We were spending a lot of money to
maintain those F-4s. And we wanted to get the
F-100s out of the Guard. We needed the high-
low mix (F-15/F-16) soon. Anyway, we had a
disagreement over that and we never really got
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over it. John went on to analyze other things.
He went on to land warfare. John was a great
thinker. He did a great service to the Air Force.
But to get back in the time sequence, I went
from DSC/Programs and Resources to the Vice
Chief of Staff position. The Chief’s plan was for
General Jerry O’Malley down at TAC to take
SAC when General Benny Davis retired, mak-
ing Jerry O’Malley the logical candidate to be
the next Chief of Staff. And I was to take TAC
and spend the rest of my active duty at TAC, a
prospect that made me happy. But then Jerry
O’Malley was killed in a T-39 accident, along
with his wife. The Chief and Secretary nomi-
nated three different people to Weinberger to
take SAC. He turned them all down, and one
day General Gabriel called me into his office
and said, “Got good news. We’ve solved the
problem of SAC.” I said, ‘Great. Who is it?”
And he said, “It’s you.” I said, “Aw, come on.”
So I went to SAC—which turned out to be one
of the best years of my Air Force career.
BOB SHELDON: Best year?
LARRY WELCH: Yes. I’ll tell you why.
When General LeMay, who chaired the board
of the Air Force Aid Society, would come to
Washington once a quarter, he would make a
30-minute appointment at noon with the Vice
Chief. Thirty minutes precisely. Not with the
Chief, but with the Vice Chief. He would give
me advice for thirty minutes and he’d leave.
Seventy percent of his advice was good and
doable, which is a very high score. When it was
announced that I was going to become CINC
SAC, he asked for an hour. He went through a
history of SAC. And he said, “Now Welch,
here’s my advice.” He said, “When Tommy
White sent me to take over SAC, he said, ‘That
command can’t fly and they can’t hit a bull in
the ass with a baseball bat. You’ve got one year
to turn that into a professional outfit. If you
can’t do it, I’ll send somebody that can’.” He
said, “Ever since then, every time everybody
goes to SAC, they act like they have that same
set of conditions.” He said, “Larry (he had
never called me Larry before), I want you to put
a stop to that. I want you to go out there and
treat people in SAC like the great people they
are, thorough professionals, doing a great job.
There’s no damn reason for SAC people to be
miserable every damn day.” I thought, who is
this guy wearing this LeMay mask?
What he didn’t know was that’s what Gen-
eral Gabriel had told me. So I went out to SAC
thinking that I would have to overcome a lot of
staff opposition. But all I had to do was kick
some obstacles out of the way, provide some
resources, and let SAC run. For example, I
asked an old friend, who was Commander 15th
Air Force, to tell me about his most innovative,
gutsy wing commander. He said it was the
commander at Fairchild. The Mission Capable
rate (MC) on the B-52 was 35%. On the tankers,
it was 36%. A third of the airplanes are on alert,
which are always MC. So something was badly
wrong with the way we maintain big airplanes.
So I told him, “Here’s the deal. I waive all SAC
regulations on maintenance and logistics. I
waive all work force regulations on mainte-
nance and logistics. You organize the way you
want to organize. I will give you the money to
put up some temporary facilities. The only ca-
veat is that you have to spend a day at Tinker
Air Force Base looking at how TAC maintains
the AWACS. And then you do what you want
to, and within five months I want to see 55%
MC rates in the B-52s and the KC-135s in this
wing.” And he said, “Sir, sounds great.”
Two months later, every wing in SAC, save
one, had asked for the same dispensation. At
the end of six months, every wing in SAC, save
one, was above 55%MC rating on both the B-52
and the KC-135. Then we held a conference of
wing commanders and deputies for mainte-
nance at SAC and told them, “Now we know
how to do this. You guys tell us what kind of
directives we need to institutionalize what
you’ve done to take care of this problem.” The
whole point is that there was so much dedica-
tion and so much talent at SAC, that had been
so constrained by the culture of the nuclear
mission, that the first thing I had to do was
convince the two numbered Air Force com-
manders and then all the wing commanders to
change. I told them they had to be schizo-
phrenic. That is, if it had anything to do with
nuclear weapons or nuclear systems the rule
was zero innovation—zero defects—rigid ad-
herence to checklists—no changes. We had a
perfect record and we would keep it a perfect
record. For everything else, I expected innova-
tion, risks, and would accept mistakes. I told
them, “The only way you can get in trouble on
this is not being innovative. If you don’t take
risks, if you are so cautious that you don’t make
any mistakes, then you’re going to be in trou-
ble.” They became convinced that we were se-
rious about it. They transformed SAC in a year,
doing what General Bill Creech’s people did at
TAC in four years. They were able to do it more
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quickly partly because they had the model for
the experience at TAC. They knew it could be
done because they saw TAC do it.
I’ll give you another anecdote about SAC
people. I went to Grand Forks where the main-
tenance offices and shops were in a large han-
gar with terrible lighting and GSA temporary
partitions. I told them we needed a first-class
maintenance facility if we expected our people
to be professionals—professional tools and pro-
fessional environment to demand professional
performance. I suggested that we “fix this han-
gar up.” They said they had looked at it and the
price tag was $5 million. I asked what it would
cost to do it themselves. After a day of calcula-
tions, they said it would be about $650,000. I
told them I would get them the money and
would be back to see it when it was finished.
They promised it in six months. I came back in
four and a half months and walked into a to-
tally transformed maintenance complex—
walls, suspended ceilings, great shops, good
lighting, and good heating.
As I walked in the hangar door, I was look-
ing down a hall running the length of the han-
gar. The wall was perfectly straight—thor-
oughly professional. I asked, “How did you put
this together in four and a half months?” The
Deputy for Maintenance said, “Sir, some week-
ends we had 350 volunteers working out here.”
I asked, “With 350 people working, how did
they get that wall so straight?” He said, “Sir,
these are maintenance people.” And, that was
the SAC attitude. So that’s why it was so great.
You couldn’t not love those dedicated people.
JIM BEXFIELD: As I recall, you had Hank
Shinol doing some analysis work for you at
SAC?
LARRY WELCH: Sure did. We had a good
analysis shop at SAC. People with lots of expe-
rience who understood the problems and that
were delighted to have these problems to work
on. They’d kind of been ignored other than
being asked to help with the SIOP (Single Inte-
grated Operations Plan). I handed them a new
and broader set of problems to help with, and
they were responsive and very good.
BOB SHELDON: Was this your first time
having to work with a SIOP, when you were at
SAC?
LARRY WELCH: Yes.
BOB SHELDON: How did you find that
process as compared to your TAC work?
LARRYWELCH: I looked at that SIOP pro-
cess and asked, “Why don’t we see if we can’t
move into the 20th century.” They were doing
things with strings on maps. In the same vein,
the standard SAC training mission was eight
hours. I asked why it needed to be eight hours.
If it’s eight hours that means a crew only gets to
fly twice a month—maybe three times. They
said, “Well, because” and ran out of thoughts
about there. I told them I had finally figured it
out. That’s about how long it takes to fly to
Moscow and they had to prove every month
that their fanny was tough enough to fly to
Moscow. So I mandated three-hour missions.
The response was “Sir, you can’t do the mission
in three hours.” I challenged them to tell me the
base with the biggest issues with range loca-
tions?” And they told me it was Wurtsmith Air
Force Base. So I went to Wurtsmith and flew a
complete standardization evaluation mission
with the wing stand-eval team, with the objec-
tive of doing it in three hours. I’d been to Castle
and completed an abbreviated B-52 school by
then. We did a full evaluation in two hours and
forty-seven minutes and that included thirty
minutes on the refueling boom—the toughest
task for the pilot. So we went to three-hour
missions and everybody jumped on board, de-
claring what a good idea it was. So now I said
I wanted the crews to fly five times a month.
And then they said we couldn’t do that
because it takes a day to brief, and after the
mission, it takes a day to debrief and then the
crew spends three days on alert. I asked why it
took a day to brief for a mission. The answer
was that it takes that long to do the planning,
produce the maps, and brief the flight. So we
introduced some people to the marvels of com-
puter-aided planning to reduce mission prepa-
ration time to no more than two hours, and
mission debrief to be no more than two hours.
Further, the goal was to go from computer
aided planning directly to the airplane com-
puter, and from the airplane computer to the
debrief. Many were highly skeptical about com-
puter-aided planning, but they figured it out
and it worked.
BOB SHELDON: What happened there?
LARRY WELCH: They changed their atti-
tude and expectation. It took some minimum
software development and some very limited
hardware development. I found the money for
them and they got it done.
BOB SHELDON: So after SAC you became
Chief?
LARRY WELCH: Yes, I went from the joys
of being CINCSAC to the world of the Chief of
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Staff of the Air Force—certainly a very differ-
ent world.
BOB SHELDON: You spent almost four
years there?
LARRY WELCH: It’s a statutory four-year
term. You serve four years or you get fired.
Obviously being Chief is a great experience.
You get to accomplish a lot, but there is a great
difference from being a four-star field com-
mander, particularly CINCSAC. One of the
things I learned quickly in SAC was don’t say,
“I wonder if we ought to think about this,”
because the next day it’ll be done. You really
have to be sure people understand—I want you
to go think about this, I want to have a meeting
two days from now, then we’ll decide whether
this is a good idea. And then when they come
in, you really have to make it clear you don’t
want to hear them say, “This is a good idea”
because you suggested that it might be useful
to think about it. So you have to start the meet-
ing with something like, “Now if you tell me
this is a good idea, you’re really going to have
to convince me this is a good idea. You’re going
to have to tell me why this is a good idea.” And
so you have to teach them that that’s how you
are. Because that isn’t necessarily what they’re
used to. CINCSAC is very much the guy in
charge in that world. Nobody outsideWashing-
ton really argued with CINCSAC. In fact, the
Congress didn’t argue much with CINCSAC.
After that, it is a bit of a cultural shock to come
to Washington and become Chief of Staff of the
Air Force, where there are dozens of people
who argue with you. And when you think
you’ve made a decision, that’s a signal for a
host of opposing worms to come out of the
woodwork. So to be effective, the Chief has to
be tough, persistent, and about some things,
absolutely brutal. And the Chief also has to
pick those things that he really is going to get
done while he delegates other things to some-
body else who has the time and is in a position
to give it the needed attention.
For example, I decided that I was going to
fix the officer evaluation system because it had
become absolutely dysfunctional. I put enor-
mous effort into doing that. The good news is
that because I recruited a lot of very thoughtful
people to help, the officer evaluation system we
created is still in use and it still works. To do
that, I formed three teams. One was a team of
senior retired officers led by General Dixon.
Another was a team of people from MPC (Mil-
itary Personnel Center). We also formed a team
of outside civilians and industry. They were
told, “Here’s the problem. Now you tell us the
solution.” So clearly, there are things a Chief
can do that can’t be done anywhere else.
But there are so many issues and there are
so many people to convince, that you really
don’t go home every day saying, “Boy, this has
been a good day.” Sometimes you go home
saying, “Well, I don’t think I hurt anybody
today.” But in the end, when you look back on
it, the test of your level of job satisfaction is
whether you can say “Well, the Air Force is a
lot better Air Force for your tenure.” There is a
lot you expected to get done that didn’t hap-
pen. But if you left the Air Force better than you
found it, and also you left behind a lineup of
promising flag officers that you had every con-
fidence would continue to make a better and
better Air Force, that is probably enough. I
thought I left behind a much, much more joint
attitude than I found when I went there. I’ve
always been very joint operations oriented. So
all in all, being Chief was a satisfying experi-
ence, but I’ll close that chapter with an anec-
dote.
For retirement as Chief, my preference
would be to just say, “Bye folks,” and walk out,
but you can’t do that. People would think
you’re mad about something. So you have to go
through some kind of ceremony that includes a
lot of people in the July sun, including troops at
attention. Having done that, I know how much
they appreciate that particular honor. It is hot-
ter than hell, the troops are out there sweating,
a bunch of airplanes fly by, and I was sitting
there. By the way, they had Eunice sitting over
at the side, off the platform. I decided that piece
of protocol didn’t begin to recognize her con-
tribution to the Air Force, so I brought her and
her chair to the platform beside me with the
Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs. Anyway, I’m sitting there and there’s
some drill teams out there doing stuff, which
never did excite me much. I started laughing
under my breath, and Eunice whispered,
“What’s the matter with you?” Later, I told her
I could hardly keep my composure because I
suddenly had this vision. Instead of all the
pomp, I had this vision of a giant screen on the
field and a projector, projecting a tape of Martin
Luther King saying, “Free at last. Free at last.
Oh my God, free at last.” And you know, that’s
sort of how I felt leaving the Chief’s job. I
wouldn’t trade those four years for anything.
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But I would not have wanted to serve four
years and one day.
BOB SHELDON: You had a son at the Air
Force Academy about that time. I was teaching
math out there.
LARRY WELCH: He graduated from the
Academy about the same time I graduated
from the Air Force, and that was hard for him.
Can you imagine being the Chief’s son at the
Air Force Academy?
JIM BEXFIELD: What’s he doing now?
LARRY WELCH: He’s an Air Force major.
That was a learning and character building ex-
perience for him. Here’s a kid who grew up as
a general’s son, with his friends’ fathers wear-
ing two and three stars. And he goes out to
Colorado and finds out that a captain is God.
Fortunately, he knew it when he went out
there. He’s a bright kid.
BOB SHELDON: What’s his career field?
LARRY WELCH: Communications. He’s
an electrical engineer. He didn’t have the eyes
to be a pilot—he probably could have got a
waiver if he’d been anybody but the Chief’s
son. But he loves his job. He loves the Air Force
and has lots of very unusual experiences. He
was the commander of a combat communica-
tions flight. He was the commander of the only
Air Force unit in Haiti, the combat communi-
cations flight that supported the joint head-
quarters in Haiti. He was the leader of the
technical team that put together the control
communications and the control stuff to fly the
Predator from Langley, Virginia. Many experts
said it couldn’t be done because of the latency
problem. But combat comm people don’t know
“can’t” and his colonel made certain that they
had every opportunity to make it work and
they did. So they can fly the Predator over
Afghanistan and Iraq from the 5th floor of a
building in Langley, Virginia.
JIM BEXFIELD: In terms of the role of
analysis, are you seeing that changing over
time?
LARRY WELCH: I think it’s become much
more widely understood. That is increasingly
apparent from my current vantage point. Let
me say just a bit about that. About a month
before I finished my tour as Chief of Staff, I got
what I thought was a strange phone call from
the General Counsel saying there was someone
who wanted to talk to me about a position after
retirement. The General Counsel had advised
that it’s okay as long as you talk very carefully.
I asked what it was about, and he said that the
Chairman of the Board at the Institute for De-
fense Analyses wants to talk to you about be-
coming President of IDA. I laughed, thinking
why would I want to be President of IDA? And
I thought about it and I thought, well, I have to
meet my own standard of conflict of interest.
And although it’d be legal for me to go to work
for the defense industry, I could never move
from Chief of Staff to industry simply because
there was no defense industry where I hadn’t
made decisions that affected it. So I decided I
could not go to work for the defense industry.
So then I thought, well, I’ll talk to this guy. We
had dinner three times, and I decided that for
the next three or four years, that’s what I
wanted to do. So I agreed with the board that I
would serve not less than three years. Thirteen
years later, I didn’t enjoy it any less than the
first three years and my Board of Trustees re-
mained highly supportive. But I decided it was
time to take the opportunity to put a new per-
son in the position, because thirteen years is
long enough and because there were a couple
of very attractive candidates that I thought we
could recruit. And I also knew full well that
there are things that are probably important
that I was neglecting. So it is healthy to have a
new leader after a while. So I stepped down as
President so the Board could take the opportu-
nity to choose the right successor.
JIM BEXFIELD: It seems like, as I’ve lis-
tened to you for a couple of hours, that the
thing that really excites you is solving prob-
lems.
LARRY WELCH: Absolutely.
JIM BEXFIELD: And as long as you have a
job that causes you to solve problems, you’re
going to enjoy life.
LARRY WELCH: I’ve had an astounding
set of opportunities, starting with when I was a
lieutenant. I was sent from Williams Air Force
Base down to Laughlin Air Force Base because
Laughlin had become a pilot training base in-
stead of a gunnery base, while Williams became
a gunnery base. So I had a new opportunity.
Lieutenant Welch was tasked, as an additional
duty, to re-do all the regulations from crew
training to flying training. That pattern of new
challenges repeated and escalated with each
new assignment and each new rank. So it has
been my lot and pleasure to be in positions to
address new sets of challenges.
JIM BEXFIELD: You’re still doing that at
this point?
LARRY WELCH: Yes.
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JIM BEXFIELD: Let me ask a MORS ques-
tion. You’ve had a close relationship with
MORS for at least the past decade. How would
you view MORS’ value to the military commu-
nity?
LARRY WELCH: Well, obviously I had
thought for a long time that MORS is very
valuable—for at least three or four reasons. For
one, there is the education mission. And it’s a
community builder. And it’s facilitating analy-
sis in its own right. Any time you have an
organization that attracts a bunch of very bright
analysts who work across a very wide range of
issues in diverse locations for diverse motiva-
tions, it has to be of high value to the overall
quality of analysis. I don’t know any other ap-
proach that fills that role.
BOB SHELDON: What advice would you
give a young analyst starting out?
LARRY WELCH: Take on the hard prob-
lem when you have the opportunity, and solve
it. It’s much, much better to take on something
so hard you’re not sure you can do it, than it is
to play it safe. I guess the other advice, which is
very hard for people who are bright enough to
be really good analysts to take, is to learn to
listen—you do your best thinking while listen-
ing. You do your poorest thinking while talk-
ing. I recall that on one occasion, at a going-
away party for Jim Knight, the Vice
Commander and a very quiet Texan, the emcee
who knew us both well, joked that, “The defi-
nition of a quiet evening is dinner with Jim
Knight and Larry Welch.” I took that as a com-
pliment.
JIM BEXFIELD: Your approach seems to
be to listen to the briefing first, and then ask
questions. As opposed to asking questions
while the briefing’s going on.
LARRY WELCH: I would rather let the
briefer provide their understanding with mini-
mum interruption. Then your response should
be of real help. It doesn’t help to tell hard-
working people that their briefing needs fixing.
A responsible leader needs to be able to help
describe how to fix it. I still spend a lot of time
doing that.
JIM BEXFIELD: I understand you used to
take the slides and put them all over the table.
LARRY WELCH: That was my way to try
to get an overview quickly.
JIM BEXFIELD: And then try to move
them around and shuffle them up.
LARRY WELCH: I learned that from Gen-
eral Dixon before we used computers to create
briefings. Dixon would take a paper on a com-
plex matter and mark it up, and then he would
lay it all out on the conference table in this
conference room, and then we would walk
around the conference room table and get a
sense of the whole thing, and move things
around until it made the most sense. Dixon was
a great communicator. One thing you could be
very sure of. When I was a brigadier, I took two
or three briefcases home every night, had din-
ner with the family, usually a little late, and
then sat in front of the fireplace to go through
the briefcases. I knew that Dixon did the same.
And I learned from him, never let the sun rise
on your inbox. If you do, you’re keeping some-
one on your staff from doing their work. So the
sun set on my inbox, but never rose on it. A
related, broader lesson from Dixon was to
never let you be the reason people can’t get their
work done.
JIM BEXFIELD: That must have made for
awfully long days and not too much sleep.
LARRY WELCH: Yes, it was okay. I didn’t
play golf.
BOB SHELDON: You said General Creech
was more demanding than General Kent. In
what respect?
LARRY WELCH: More demanding than
General Dixon. Or than General Kent even,
though it was close. General Creech had such
very high standards. I remember when he first
came down to HQ TAC, we had a set of canned
briefings. We thought they were pretty good,
but the Chief was coming the next day. Yes, the
next day at ten o’clock. So we gave these dry
runs to General Creech that afternoon, and it
was clear that he didn’t like them. I was still the
XP. The DO is in charge of the whole thing. So
General Creech takes one of my briefings and
he said, “Okay, Welch. Listen. We’re only going
to have a couple of hours with the Chief. So I
don’t want to give him the scatter shot treat-
ment. I want to focus on one thing. And here’s
what I want to focus on.” And he laid down
what he wanted to focus on. He said, “Now, I
know it’s going to be a lot of work to put that
together,” but he said, “I’d like to see it at eight
o’clock in the morning.” This is five o’clock in
the afternoon. And I said, “Okay.”
So I sat down with my mission impossible
group and, having committed to memory ev-
erything he had said about what he wanted, we
laid out a greatly expanded Flags programs.
Dixon had initiated Red Flag and Green Flag,
but General Creech had laid out this whole
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series of flag programs that we would use to
guide the evolution of tactical air power. And I
was to create a briefing laying out all this for
the Chief.
So at eight o’clock the next morning, he
said, “You don’t need to brief me, Larry. I know
you’re tired. Just flip through the slides, and
then go rest for an hour, and be ready to talk to
the Chief.” So I flipped through them, and he
said, “I think we are ready to fire for effect.” He
then had “a few little things” to fix, which
meant changing virtually every slide. But it was
easy to fix, since we then had the capability to
quickly make slides. And so I stood up at ten
o’clock and gave an hour and twenty-minute
briefing to the Chief, playing back a lot of
Creech’s phrases. And General Creech didn’t
say a word, even expecting me to answer the
Chief’s questions even though he could have
answered them much better.
Then there was a twenty-minute discussion
mostly between General Creech and the Chief.
So then Creech said, “Now, Chief, I need your
approval to do the Checkered Flag, because it’s
going to cost some money.” The Chief said, “Go
for it.” He said, “And Chief, I’ll need your
approval for Silver Flag, because it’s going to
cost some money.” The Chief said, “Oh, not
much. Go ahead and do it.” So that was my first
introduction to General Creech. And needless
to say, we had a good relationship. But that
event illustrated what he expected. He ex-
pected you to be able to take his guidance and
turn it into action. That is what he demanded of
you all the time.
JIM BEXFIELD: How about what he de-
manded of himself?
LARRY WELCH: He had to pace himself a
bit. He had a heart condition. He didn’t let it
keep him from doing anything, but he couldn’t
afford to get too tired. But he was very, very
efficient. So he could do a lot without working
anything like the hours that I had to work to
meet his expectations. I had only one job in the
Air Force where if I’d had 10% less to do, I
could have done everything 20% better. That
was as TAC DO, working for General Creech.
Most demanding job I had in the Air Force.
JIM BEXFIELD: I recall a situation when
you were Chief, when you signed out a letter
regarding the use of Tac Brawler in F-22 anal-
ysis. Any comments you’d like to make?
LARRY WELCH: It was, again, a solution.
We put out requests for proposals (RFPs) and
then tried to do an analysis for source selection.
It was a black art. The contractors ran their own
models and then, based on their models, de-
clared what the system could do and what it
would cost. So source selection was heavily
dependent on deciding what and who to be-
lieve. So Joe Ralston, who at that time was
down in RD, was my project guy on the F-22.
He was a colonel or maybe a brigadier by then.
So we sat down to address how to make source
selection more orderly—how to pick what we
really wanted. So Joe asked if there wasn’t
some standard model we could filter all the
proposals through. So we picked Tac Brawler
and required that each contractor provide a
data deck for Tac Brawler. We informed the
contractors that Tac Brawler would be the per-
formance evaluation tool. We knew they would
then try to game Tac Brawler but didn’t care,
since I was convinced that Tac Brawler would
do a better job of giving us insights into the
right stuff than any other approach available
to us.
And that’s how that came to pass. It was
really Joe Ralston’s idea. We operationalized it
by telling industry that’s what we’re going to
use to evaluate you. I’m sure that drove a lot of
people crazy trying to understand the model, to
figure out what it really measured.
JIM BEXFIELD: Any stories concerning
Clayton Thomas that you might want to share?
LARRY WELCH: I don’t have anything
specific. Except several times when I was really
stuck, Clayton was the difference between suc-
cess and failure. After the early months, Kent
never handed me a problem unless it was a
tough problem. And there were several times
when I just couldn’t imagine how to get started.
But if I could just get a thought on how to get
started, we could usually figure out how to do
it. And Clayton was great at that. I would tell
him the problem, and he would ask a few ques-
tions, and suggest a couple of methodologies or
a couple of approaches. And then I’d go back
and think about it a little bit, figure out how to
use one of the approaches, and off we’d go. I
never failed to get the help from Clayton that I
asked, and he never ever came around later and
said, “Did you do what I advised you to do?”
He was just totally ego-free. When you asked
him for help, you got that help, and that was it.
He didn’t seek any credit. He didn’t want you
to come back and tell him how wonderful he
was. He just did it. And I think he was the only
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one in the strategic division that I had such a
relationship with. He was an ops analyst in
support of the strategic guy. I got started with
him at some social gatherings early on. I don’t
remember the occasion, but he was standing
alone doing something, and I went over and
introduced myself and, in the course of the
conversation, one of my current challenges
came up and he said, “I have a thought or two
on that. Why don’t you come see me?” So I
went to see him. And he did have a thought or
two on it.
JIM BEXFIELD: He always had good
thoughts.
LARRY WELCH: Yes.
JIM BEXFIELD: I notice you’re affiliated
with Homeland Security now. Are you provid-
ing some analytic insights on homeland secu-
rity issues?
LARRY WELCH: I chair the advisory com-
mittee to the Homeland Security’s Science and
Technology Directorate. Science and Technol-
ogy in Homeland Security is much broader
than what you think of in DoD. It’s more like
AT&L—perhaps a kind of half an AT&L. The
advisory committee looks at their programs
and looks at the gap analysis, and gives them
advice on how to get on with the job. We’ve
only had two meetings. We have formed into
panels. Homeland Security has lots of needs,
and I hope we have enough ideas to give them
some help. I have a good group of people on
the committee, so I think it’ll be useful. I didn’t
need that extra opportunity, by the way.
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